

Rupture Definition § 195.2

PHMSA Response: (suggested definition for Committee consideration)

“Notification of Potential Rupture” means any of the following events that involve an unintentional and uncontrolled release of a large volume of hazardous liquid or CO₂ from a pipeline:

(1) A release of hazardous liquid or CO₂ observed or reported to the operator by its field personnel, nearby pipeline or utility personnel, the public, local responders, or public authorities, and that may be representative of an unintentional and uncontrolled release event meeting paragraphs (2) or (3) of this definition is observed or reported to the operator;

(2) The operator observes an unanticipated or unplanned pressure loss outside of the pipeline’ normal operating parameters, as defined in the **operator’s procedures**. ~~If the operator establishes a threshold that is greater than a 10 percent pressure loss, occurring within a time interval of 15 minutes or less, The operator must document the operational changes pressure-change threshold due to pipeline flow dynamics (pressure, flow rate, or volume) caused by fluctuations in hazardous liquid or CO₂ demand, that could indicate a rupture; or~~

(3) The operator observes an unexplained flow rate change, pressure change, instrumentation indication, or equipment function that may be representative of an event meeting paragraph (2) of this definition.

Note: Notification occurs when a rupture, as defined in this section, is first observed by or reported to pipeline operating personnel or a controller.



Rupture Mitigation

§§ 195.2, 195.258(c), 195.260(c), (e), (g), & (h), 195.402(e)(4), 195.418, & 195.452(i)(4)



Committee Voting Slides

The proposed rule as published in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Evaluation, with regard to rupture mitigation, are technically feasible, reasonable, cost-effective, and practicable, if the following changes are made:

- Changing the definition of ‘rupture’ as recommended by PHMSA staff during this meeting and as presented in the slides.
- Eliminating the prescriptive 10-minute rupture identification.
- Requiring that valves be closed “as soon as practicable” but not more than 30 minutes “of operator identification of a rupture.” Operators must document a method for rupture identification in their procedure manual.
- Allowing manual valves, in non-HCA remote locations only, to exceed the 30-minute closure time requirement if the operator submits a notification; demonstrates that installing an ASV or RCV is economically, technically, or operationally infeasible; and receives a “no objection” from PHMSA.
- Revising applicable sections to eliminate duplication and improve readability.



Rupture Mitigation Valves

LPAC
Approved
7/23

§§ 195.258(c), 195.260(c), (e), (g), & (h), 195.418(a), (b), (d), (e), & (h), & 195.452(i)(4) Committee Voting Slides

The proposed rule as published in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Evaluation, with regard to filing reports for rupture mitigation valves, are technically feasible, reasonable, cost-effective, and practicable, if the following changes are made:

- Incorporating reporting requirements (similar to notification requirements § 192.18 for gas pipelines) into the final rule.
- Revising the final rule to designate a valve on crossover piping that is locked and tagged closed in accordance with operating procedures as a rupture mitigation valve.
- Revising the final rule to address applicability to multiple replacements that, in the aggregate, exceed 2 miles within 5 contiguous miles within a 24-month period.
- Adding specificity on standards for PHMSA review of ‘other technology’ and manual valve notifications.
- Changing the timeframe to activate Rupture Mitigation valve after completion of construction from 7 days to 14 days.
- PHMSA would consider exceptions for pipelines with SMYS of 30% or less considering cost-benefit issues and while maintaining the integrity of the rule.
- PHMSA would consider reducing the implementation of the rule to be between 12 and 18 months, based on committee discussion.
- PHMSA would consider the appropriateness of applying this rulemaking, or a separate rulemaking, to gathering lines due to the lack of public notice. PHMSA will give due consideration to the dialogue between members, the public, and PHMSA staff, during the meeting.



Valve Spacing, Location, Status Monitoring

§§ 195.260(c) & (e), 195.418(b), (f), (g) & 195.452(i)(4)

LPAC
Approved
7/23

Committee Voting Slides

The proposed rule as published in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Evaluation, with regard to filing reports for valve spacing, location, and status monitoring, are technically feasible, reasonable, cost-effective, and practicable, if the following changes are made:

- Adding 25% tolerance to the spacing for HVL lines.
- Revising the rule to clarify that replacement projects in non-HCA locations do not require rupture mitigation valves unless the replacement project involves a valve (i.e., an “opportunistic” approach).
- Add a notification requirement to allow HL operators to obtain valve spacing relief on a case-by-case basis.
- Specifying in § 195.418(b) that the shutoff segment must contain the new or replaced segment that could affect an HCA. (cont.)



Valve Spacing, Location, Status Monitoring

§§ 195.260(c) & (e), 195.418(b), (f), (g) & 195.452(i)(4)



Committee Voting Slides

The proposed rule as published in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Evaluation, with regard to filing reports for valve spacing, location, and status monitoring, are technically feasible, reasonable, cost-effective, and practicable, if the following changes are made:

- Specifying that rupture mitigation valves would not be required at the downstream termination of the pipeline.
- Specifying 100-year flood plain at HL water crossings.
- Specifying that operational block valves would be permitted within a shutoff segment and rupture mitigation valves need not be the nearest valve to the shutoff segment.
- Specifying that ASV status need not be monitored if the operator can monitor pressures or flows to be able to identify and locate a rupture (similar to manual valves).



Maintenance & Failure Investigation

§§ 195.402(c)(5), 195.420(b), (d), (e), & (f)



Committee Voting Slides

The proposed rule as published in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Evaluation, with regard to filing reports for maintenance and failure investigations, are technically feasible, reasonable, cost-effective, and practicable, if the following changes are made:

- Deleting the requirement for point-to-point testing from § 195.420(d) (duplicates requirements in the control room management at § 195.446).
- Clarifying that annual drills apply to manually-operated valves only (either by manual operation of a local actuator or by hand), not to ASVs or RCVs.

(cont.)



Maintenance & Failure Investigation

§§ 195.402(c)(5), 195.420(b), (d), (e), & (f)

Committee Voting Slides



The proposed rule as published in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Evaluation, with regard to filing reports for maintenance and failure investigations, are technically feasible, reasonable, cost-effective, and practicable, if the following changes are made:

- Specifying that 25% valve closure is sufficient to demonstrate successful completion of the response time validation drill.
- Allowing notification by operators that justify a need to extend the timeframes for repair and establishing alternate rupture mitigation valves. PHMSA will consider adjusting the timeframe for repairs to 12 months but as soon as practicable.
- Specifying that alternate compliant valves would not be required to comply with spacing requirements.



Communications with 9-1-1

§ 195.402(c)(4), (c)(12), (e)(1), (e)(4), (e)(7), & (e)(10)



Committee Voting Slides

The proposed rule as published in the Federal Register and the Draft Regulatory Evaluation, with regard to filing reports for communications with 9-1-1, are technically feasible, reasonable, cost-effective, and practicable, if the following changes are made:

- Stating that communication with 9-1-1 applies to all ruptures, without exception.
- Limiting § 195.402(c)(12) to emergency preparedness activities and § 195.402(e)(7) to emergency response activities.
- Including provisions for pipelines not located within 9-1-1 areas or that have no public safety answering points, or have an inability to contact the local 9-1-1 center.
- Stating that operators may establish liaison with the appropriate local emergency response coordinating agencies, such as 9-1-1 emergency call centers or county emergency managers, in addition to communicating individually with each fire, police, or other public entity, as appropriate.



Committee Report



Committee Voting Slides

The transcript of this meeting (duly recorded and accurately transcribed), together with the presentation slides documenting the committee's votes during this meeting, represent the report of this proceeding.

