



An Approach for Evaluating Pressure Upgrades Using Reliability and Risk Analysis

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Background

■ Canadian experience is to perform EAs to evaluate:


- Pressure Increases,
- Class Changes,
- Changes in service fluid

■ QRA Techniques often used to:


- Evaluate risk implications, and,
- Select mitigation measures

■ Replacement avoided in lieu of:

- Targeted excavations,
- ↓ assessment intervals,
- ↑ 3rd Party Prevention measures, etc.



General Concept – Assessment of Pressure Change



- Pressure increase drives increase in risk due to:
 - ↓ defect tolerance
 - ↑ in PIA ($R = 0.69 [P D^2]^{0.5}$)
- By quantifying Δ Risk, mitigation measures are selected
 - Risk is managed to a level \leq level prior to pressure upgrade



Risk Implications of Pressure Change

$$\text{Risk} = [(\text{Failure Likelihood}) \times (\text{Consequences})]$$

Pressure Change impacts risk in two ways:


1. ↑ Consequence

- $(R = 0.69 [P D^2]^{0.5})$
- Consequence \propto PIA
- Consequence \propto Pressure


2. ↑ Failure Likelihood

- $\uparrow P \gg \downarrow$ Critical Flaw Size
- » \uparrow Failure Likelihood

Effect of Pressure on Potential Impact Area for a 30" Pipeline




Operating Stress Level Vs. Critical Flaw Size - 30" Pipeline



Quantification of Consequence Impacts

- PIA is calculated for both pressure cases
- Structure counts are performed
- Structure Occupancy Rates are applied
- Consequences are calculated for both pressure cases



Quantification of Failure Likelihood Impacts


Reliability Approach

- In a Reliability-based approach:

**FAILURE OCCURS WHEN
LOAD EXCEEDS RESISTANCE**

$$\begin{aligned} POE &= P(\text{Load} > \text{Resistance}) \\ &= P(\text{Resistance} - \text{Load}) \leq 0 \\ &= P(P_{\text{Burst}} - MOP) \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- Load and Resistance considered as joint probability density functions



Reliability Tools

Limit State Equation - Corrosion

$$P_{\text{burst}} = \left(\frac{2t}{D} \right) \cdot (SMYS + 10,000) \cdot \left[\frac{1 - 0.85 \frac{d}{t}}{1 - 0.85 \frac{d}{t \cdot M_2}} \right]$$

■ FORM, SORM, Monte Carlo

- Account for probability distributions of each parameter
- Account for interrelationship of parameters
- Failure Equation based on Limit State Equation
 - ASME B31G
 - EPRG Model (fatigue life of plain dents)
 - Tokyo Gas Equation (fatigue life of gouge-in-dent)
 - Maxey Q-Factor (immediate failure due to 3rd Party Damage)

Failure Equation - Corrosion


$$P_f = P \left\{ \left[\left(\frac{2t}{D} \right) \cdot (SMYS + 10,000) \cdot \left(\frac{1 - 0.85 \frac{d}{t}}{1 - 0.85 \frac{d}{t \cdot M_2}} \right) \right] - MOP \right\} \leq 0$$



Sample Application of Reliability Method: *Threat of Failure Due to Corrosion*

■ Uncertainty in Defect Size:

- ◆ Influenced by:
 - Time since inspection;
 - Defect Growth rate;
 - Sizing accuracy of inspection tool





Sample Application of Reliability Method: Threat of Failure Due to Corrosion (Continued)

■ Defect Size Distribution $f(d)$:

- ◆ Describes relationship between actual depth and ILI estimated depth



Depth Error Density Distribution
Normal Distribution Approximation



Sample Application of Reliability Method: Threat of Failure Due to Corrosion (Continued)

Defect Growth Rate Distribution $f(R)$:


- ◆ Specific to each ILI feature:
- ◆ $f(R) = f(d)/(Growth\ Period)$



Sample Application of Reliability Method: Threat of Failure Due to Corrosion (Continued)

■ Interaction of Defects:

- ◆ OR-Gate: $\{1 - [(1 - P_1) \cdot (1 - P_2) \dots (1 - P_n)]\}$



3rd Party Damage Approaches

- Two Scenarios:

- ◆ Immediate failure at time of pipeline contact
- ◆ Delayed failure: exposure of sub-critical defect to stress cycles

- Immediate Failure Scenario limit state function $h(x)$:

$$\sigma_f = \bar{\sigma} \left(\frac{(Q - C_2)^{0.6}}{C_3} \right)$$
$$Q = C_{v, (2/3)} \left(\frac{R t}{D d_g c_g} \right)$$

- Delayed Failure Scenario limit state function $h(x)$:

$$N_f = Z \left(\frac{d}{2R} \right)^\alpha \left(\frac{g}{t} \right)^\beta \left(\frac{\Delta\sigma}{2E} \right)^\gamma$$



3rd Party Damage Methodology - Immediate Failure Scenario

$$FF_{3PD} = H \times POE_{Given Hit}$$

Where,

H = Hit Frequency (Event Tree Modeling)

$POE_{Given Hit}$ = POE, Given an Excavator Hit


Derived Either From:

- 3rd Party Damage Feature Size Distributions
- Damage Modeling



3rd Party Damage Methodology - Hit Frequency Modeling*


*Reliability-Based Prevention of Mechanical Damage, Proceedings of EPRG/PRCI 12th Biennial Joint Technical Meeting on Pipeline Research, May, 1999



Risk Mitigation Strategies

Assessment Interval Modification


- **Influence of time-dependent threats:** \uparrow Risk with time.
- Manage risk through Δ assessment interval
 - ◆ Goal: *Risk at end of new interval \leq risk at end of the old interval prior to $\uparrow P$*



Risk Mitigation Strategies

Targeted Excavations

- Risk often dominated by presence of small number (1-3) of features after passage of time
- Manage risk via targeted excavations prior to end of assessment period
 - ◆ confirm the size of the features,
 - ◆ re-coat or otherwise repair those features




Risk Mitigation Strategies

Additional Measures to Prevent 3rd Party Damage

- Event Tree Modeling » Calculate risk-reduction benefits:
 - ◆ Increased signage
 - ◆ Installation of pipeline warning tape at crossings
 - ◆ Improved one-call response

Risk Impact of 3rd Party Mitigation



Summary

- Approach removes subjectivity from analysis:
 - Methods recognized and accepted in other critical end-use industries
 - nuclear industry
 - aviation industry
 - Employs results of industry-sponsored research (limit state functions)
 - Analysis is defensible without arm-waving
- 10s of millions of dollars in pipe replacement cost savings in Canada
- Focus is on desired results: *Managing risk through adoption of most cost effective risk mitigation solution*
- Consistent with current risk-management focus in DOT-regulated facilities
- Holistic approach - addresses risk along entire length of pipeline segment being subjected to pressure increase (not only confined to HCAs)

